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Abstract
Selection in privatization is a decision-making process of choosing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), prioritizing and sequencing privatizing events, and determining the extent of private ownership in partial privatization. We investigate this process in an important but rarely studied case of China. Based on the SOE population over 1998-2008, we track 49,456 wholly SOEs and identify 9,359 privatization cases over time. Our econometric analysis concludes: (i) The privatization selection is a complex decision-making process in which local governments balance between various economic, financial and political objectives. (ii) In the recent Chinese privatization, firm performance relates to the selection, staging and sequencing in privatization in an inverted-U fashion. The worse and the best performing SOEs are more likely to remain state-owned, maintain higher state holding when privatized, and are less likely to be privatized later in time. These patterns suggest the privatization reform slowdown and the underlying changes in the privatization policy. 
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Privatization is arguably the most crucial economic reform in a command economy. A large body of literature has studied the causes, processes and effects of this important economic policy (see recent surveys by Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Megginson, 2005 and Estrin et al., 2009). However, while the outcome of privatization has stimulated a great deal of research, the selection process of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into privatization programs has received less attention (Szentpéteri and Telegdy, 2010). Selection in privatization refers to the decision-making process of choosing candidates among SOEs, prioritizing and sequencing privatizing events as well as, in the case of partial privatization, determining a desirable extent of private ownership. Selection exists in any privatization, even in countries where a rapid privatization was adopted (Gupta et al., 2008). The key questions of selection may differ, in that prioritizing and sequencing may be more acute for mass privatization, while selecting and staging privatization may be more relevant in a gradual progression. 
	There are several reasons why it is fundamental to understand the selection process.  First, choosing appropriate SOEs to privatize and sequence the process is strategically important for implementing privatization policy for an economy, not the least because of the demonstration effects of earlier privatized examples (Gupta et al., 2008). The industrial sector dynamics are affected as a result of market power changes. This will further alter the dynamics of societies, which consequently affect the sustainability of the privatization and other economic policies. 
	Second, it is critical to pick the privatization candidates that are “ready” at the right time in order to optimize the conversion outcome. The past experience suggests that the selection process determines the results of ownership change and economic structuring (Estrin et al., 2009). 
	Moreover, methodologically, a rigorous evaluation of the privatization outcome cannot be delivered without a proper understanding and effective treatment of the selection process (Gupta et al., 2008; Driffield and Du, 2008; Estrin et al., 2009).​[1]​ 
	Yet, the selection process of privatization is complex and opaque. Conceptually, economic, social and political factors independently or jointly influence the decision-making process of privatization and the dynamics between state-owned enterprises, central government, local governments, domestic buyers, foreign investors and often employees and other social forces. The existing theories are inadequate to deal with the complicated process and the dynamics in this process. For instance, there are few theoretical models that can be easily adaptable to take multiple selection criteria into consideration and to form testable predictions. Empirical investigations are also limited by the availability of appropriate data to study privatization and the existing findings are mixed. In addition, the empirical literature unevenly focuses on Central Eastern Europe (CEE)​[2]​ and India (Dinc and Gupta, 2011), with much less work on China, especially on the recent privatization movements (Jefferson and Su, 2006; Liu et al., 2006; Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).​[3]​ 
	This study focuses on the recent privatization in China, for the sheer importance of privatization as a key reform that has led to, to a large extent, the economic prosperity China has achieved. Understanding privatization in China holds a key to understanding the success and pitfalls of the Chinese economy, and to predicting the sustainability of its growth and development. Unfortunately what we know is still little. One of the barriers is that the economic theories on the process of privatization are mostly developed in the context where central governments solely or mainly drive the process. It is rather different in China where the process was gradual and market competition played important roles, and so did the managers and employees of the SOEs. Hence it is necessary to explore the ways in which the existing theories can be adapted to Chinese institutional characteristics. 
	Furthermore, in the recent decade noticeable new trends and phenomena emerged in the Chinese privatization policy with important implications for the subsequent enterprise reform and market competition. However, the existing studies on the Chinese privatization are out-dated when it comes to addressing contemporary issues. It has been over a decade since the beginning of privatization, yet even though the state ownership of the economy has been considerably reduced, the state sector remains large and the privatization process is far from completion (Du et al., 2014). We need to identify the empirical regularities that can inform us on the dynamic changes in the China privatization process over time.
This study is set out to achieve these objectives. It extends the previous literature by examining the theoretical predictions about government objectives by allowing a nonlinear relationship between firm performance and privatization. Based on the population of the SOEs over 1998-2008, we track all the privatization cases from 49,456 originally fully state-owned enterprises, and we find robust results of the following: (i) The privatization selection is the result of a complex decision-making process in which local governments maximize the payoff by balancing between various economic, financial and political motives. (ii) In the recent Chinese privatization, firm performance relates to the selection, staging and sequencing in privatization in an inverted-U fashion. The worst and the best performing SOEs tend to remain in the state sector, and privatize with less magnitude when they are selected to privatize; and be privatized later in time if they are ever privatized. This reflects the changing policy in the recent ownership reform in China and mirrors the recent debate on “The State advances, the Private retreats” (Du et al., 2014). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of the recent Chinese privatization. Section 3 reviews the theoretical considerations and empirical evidence of the selection in privatization. Following Section 4 on data, we present the empirical model, explain the estimation strategy, and discuss the main findings of the paper in Section 5-7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2.	The recent privatization in China
This section briefly reviews the recent enterprise reform in China as the background of the large-scale privatization, analyses the distinctive characteristics of the Chinese privatization from elsewhere.​[4]​ 
China’s privatization has a rather unique background and institutional setting. In the CEE and Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) where central governments pushed the privatization policy at the outset of the liberalization adopting a top-to-bottom approach, governments were almost the sole drivers. This was not the case for China. The Chinese government has delayed privatizing SOEs for as long as it could. In fact, the large scale of privatization happened much later than the initial economic reform and marketization. The following momentous transitions depict the situation in which the Chinese government had to adopt a large-scale privatization strategy around 1998. To avoid drastic ownership changes, China’s earlier enterprise reform before the mid-1990s was centred on the control rights reform, while allowing the rapid entry of domestic private firms and foreign investors. Afterwards, the central government decentralized the affiliated SOEs to governments at a lower level (provincial, municipal/prefecture, and county and township level), in the broader context of decentralization (Xu, 2011). Smaller and poor performing SOEs were “downgraded” to lower government affiliations. By the end of 1998, 15 central governmental specialized industrial ministries were abolished, renamed or restructured (Liu, 2008). This meant that by then, their original functionality of managing SOEs was nearly dissolved, as the majority of the previously centrally affiliated SOEs were no longer under the central government’s control and planning. 
A crucial reform occurred in 1994 when the double-track price system​[5]​ ended and the new financial accounting system and the income tax law were enforced. Chinese SOEs had never been so utterly exposed to the invisible hand of the market, and this marked a turning point for China’s enterprise reform and a new beginning of the marketized economy (Liu, 2008). 
Consequently, the scale of SOEs’ loss making was unprecedented and devastating (see Table 1). Not only the extent of the total loss by loss-making SOEs was mounting, the scale of loss-making industrial sectors escalated dramatically at the national level (Column 1). In a three-year period (1994-1997), the number of two-digit sectors that on average that made losses almost doubled (Column 3). The situation of the state sector was best described as “a collectively sinking ship”. It was clear that the “reform without losers” strategy could no longer be sustained (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000).  What formed a stark contrast was the booming non-state sector (Zhu, 2012) and incoming FDI in an increasingly competitive market, leaving the government and the loss-making SOEs no choice but to reform radically.​[6]​ Therefore, competition has served a prerequisite for privatization, quite the opposite from what has been observed elsewhere in the world (Mickiewicz, 2010). 
[Table 1 is here]
Among the options to turn around this situation, privatizing SOEs was probably the most effective one (Xu, 2011). Hence, a large-scale privatization was launched in 1998 by the government and the reform was voluntarily supported by the failing SOEs. Liu and Zhu (2012) describe the recent privatization in China in two stages: Between 1995 and 2004, the enterprise reform carried out under the state’s development strategy can be characterized by privatizing small and medium-size SOEs under the slogan “retain the large, release the small” (Zhuada fangxiao), and letting the state exit competitive sectors. For small and medium SOEs, the policy was loud and clear that they were free to exit from the state sector, the approaches to this were flexible, without much government involvement.
For large SOEs, the policy was noticeably different, and governments had much more control in the privatization choices. During 2002 and 2004, large SOEs were restructured and privatized through share-holding systems. As part of this initiative, former Premier Zhu Rongji placed China’s loss-making SOEs on a strict three-year schedule, during which they were supposed to implement a modern enterprise system and convert losses to surpluses. Due to political and ideological constraints, privatization has occurred in a camouflaged way of “transforming the system” or “gaizhi” (Garnaut et al., 2005).​[7]​ Nevertheless, a large proportion of Chinese SOEs have been privatized. Not only a large amount of small SOEs were “let go” (Fan, 2002), there was also a significant decline in the number of large and medium-size SOEs. Guo et al. (2008) report that by the end of 2005, about two-thirds of the Chinese SOEs and COEs with an annual turnover of more than 5 million RMB Yuan (about USD 620,000) had been privatized and the total asset value involved in the process was about 11.4 trillion RMB (or 1.63 trillion USD).​[8]​ 
China’s approach to privatization was versatile, ranging from initial public offering (IPO), management buyout (MBO), employee buyout (EBO), and direct selling (also see Zhu 2012). The local governments and the SOEs jointly chose the specific method, which marks another unambiguous difference from the top to bottom approach in rapid mass privatization elsewhere in the world (Estrin et al., 2009; Mickiewicz, 2010). In the economically decentralized China, provincial and municipal governments have relatively large freedom in setting up their own strategies and tactics of achieving the unified economic goal. In principle, SOEs may propose a restructuring plan themselves. Once approved by the local governments, SOEs may carry out the restructuring plan as proposed, and may select the specific approach and pace according to the circumstances. 
Another notable feature of the Chinese privatization is that it was experimental and was carried out by municipal governments at their discretion under regional competition for economic growth (Xu, 2011). Hence, the process of privatization followed the market principle and resources were allocated to better use. 
3.	Government motives of privatization selection
Privatization, as an economic policy, is a tool to depoliticize SOEs and provides incentives for economic restructuring (Kornai, 1992). This process is dictated by government’s economic, fiscal and political motives, some of which are common while others are specific to context. Improving economic efficiency is considered a key government objective of privatizing SOEs (Megginson and Netter, 2001), hence governments that maximize economic efficiency will privatize less profitable, loss-making and less productive firms first (Gupta et al., 2008). This is because the most inefficient firms are assumed to experience the greatest improvement in efficiency through privatization (Claessens et al. 1997; Frydman et al. 1999). In extreme cases, unviable firms should be closed down, just as it happened in the Czech Republic (Hashi et al., 1997) and to a smaller extent in China (Liu, 2008). The existing empirical studies deliver mixed results on this prediction.​[9]​ 
To raise fiscal revenue and reduce the financial burden is an important and often short-term government motive of privatization (Mickiewicz, 2010).​[10]​ While income from direct sales was never a main motive for Chinese privatization,​[11]​ the Chinese governments do maximize revenue through retained profits and tax income. Chinese SOEs provide two streams of revenue – profit/dividend remittance and tax revenues, with the latter being mainly sales tax and income tax.​[12]​ Given tax is paid on profits where the firm is located, governments care less about its ownership​[13]​, more about whether or not firms are profitable. Consequently, revenue-maximizing local governments will then adopt the rational strategy of keeping more profit-making state-owned firms to retain control and collect higher dividend remittance. At the same time, they will privatize poor performing firms, hoping that they will perform better in private hands so that the local governments could collect higher tax income. 
The recent intensive banking reforms have made the state-owned banks more vigilant in participating in the restructuring of SOEs. They saw the SOE restructuring as an opportunity to clear the accumulated non-performing loans. Hence, local governments have the incentive to let go of the loss-making SOEs with a higher debt level, as this helps governments relieve the financial burden, and helps banks relieve non-performing loans. In a similar vein, governments maximizing revenue may select and sequence privatizing SOEs with higher compensation and settlement costs. 
A related, but subtly different incentive is to sell off the best SOEs, especially at the beginning of the reform to demonstrate the reform resolution, and provide investors particularly foreign investors, good investment opportunities (Gallagher, 2005). The underlying revenue-seeking and growth-seeking motivation is just as much political as financial, because in a country where growth is a main source of legitimacy for the ruling party, local fiscal revenue and economic growth are directly linked with cadre evaluation, upon which the promotion prospects of individual politicians hinge (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005). 
At the meantime, minimizing risks of receiving public accusation of selling public assets and inciting social discontent is key to avoid damages of promotion opportunities,​[14]​ as the losses of public assets to private and foreign owners may fuel social unrest,​[15]​ particularly when SOEs were sold at an undervalued price.​[16]​ It is easier to argue for selling poor performing SOEs, or selling them first before the better ones. Hence, local governments will keep as many decent SOEs in “people’s” hands as possible, for as long as possible. 
To summarize, local governments take into account the objectives of maximizing economic efficiency and fiscal income, and minimizing political risks when making a balanced decision regarding privatization process. While each individual theory provides useful insights into this process, they jointly appear conflicting. Hence there is yet a unified theoretical framework that satisfactorily explains the complicated process of privatization decision. The gap of the literature motivates this paper to empirically test a nonlinear relationship between firm performance and the selection criteria in privatization. We postulate that along the performance distribution, governments privatize better-performing SOEs for demonstration effects and gain sales revenue, but only to a certain extent, and keep the best performers fully state-owned, in order to achieve a higher productive efficiency and minimize public discontent. The worst SOEs tend to remain state-owned, not only because they are difficult to sell, but also because the sales revenue is not enough to compensate the financial and political costs associated with selling them. 
4.	Data
We conduct the empirical analysis on the population of state-owned enterprises in China over the period of 1998-2008 using the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB). There are several advantages of adopting this dataset for our analysis compared to survey-type datasets typically used in the privatization literature. First of all, the data contains the population of all SOEs and all above-scale non-SOEs over the decade.​[17]​ The rare comprehensive coverage across firms and over time allows us to build a profile of the ownership changes that occurred over the examined period that cannot be achieved by any survey data. 
Second, the data record the main sources of firms’ equity capital stock, including state budget, collective funds from the local government and communities, corporate funds from the corporate sector and capital markets, bonds issued by individual enterprises, individual borrowings, and investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT), as well as from foreign investors. The detailed equity finance records allow us to monitor the changes in firms’ ownership structure. Hence, not only are we able to observe dichotomous changes in the nature of ownership, in the way that most existing studies do, but also quantify the magnitude of ownership structure and capture the staging and sequencing of the privatization, reaching beyond the capacity of survey-type data or ownership registration data. 
Meanwhile, as pointed out by Gupta et al. (2008), it is much more preferable to have three-digit (or above) industrial level data to construct firms’ market share, industrial market dynamics (entry and exit), and growth potential, which is rarely possible due to data limitation. In our analysis, the available four-digit industrial classification allows us to improve on this specification. Moreover, in order to determine the ways in which the market environment affects the selection and sequencing in privatization that is vital, one needs data with coverage of population or close to population. An advantage of this database over others is that it maintains a unique enterprise identifier irrespective of the dynamics of ownership change, so we are able to distinguish between genuine new entrants and existing firms operating under a new ownership structure. The population of the SOEs and the complementary data of above-scale non-state owned enterprises account for around 85-90% of total output in most industrial sectors, which permits a well-representative description of industrial dynamics.
The final data matrix is subject to careful cross check and cleaning.​[18]​ We identified 47,498 SOEs over the period 1998 and 2008 that have the necessary information for the econometric estimation. Table 2 shows the recent privatization profile of China constructed by our data. The total number of fully state-owned firms decreases sharply from 34,078 in 1998 to 5,755 in 2008. This is consistent with recent evidence on the resulting reduction of the state sector in the ownership reform (Gan et al., 2011). The identified privatization cases range from 1,967 in 2009 to the lowest point in 2008, i.e. 376 cases.​[19]​ In light of the recent debate on “The Private Retreats Market” (Xu, 2009), the decreasing trend seems also consistent with the observation that privatization might have been intentionally slowed down. What appears stable from these series is the high percentage of equity transfer to the non-state sector in cases of privatization, which on average remains above 80% throughout the decade. In the majority of cases, the capital transfer went above 50% to make up for a majority of non-state firms, among which most cases were full privatization. Overall, 14% of the deals can be classified as minority transfers which, on average, pass 22.9% of the state share to private hands. The changing trends of both types of privatization can also be observed from Figure 1. 
[Table 2 is here]   [Figure 1 is here]
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. The most noticeable observation is the much superior performance of the privatized firms compared to the remaining SOEs. We also find the performance differences between minority and majority privatization are less statistically significant. It is not clear from these statistics that partially privatized firms are on average more productive (Li, 1997) or have better labour quality (Amess et al., 2009). More SOEs are affiliated to central government in the majority privatization cases than the remaining SOEs, showing that the enterprise reform has detached a large number of SOEs from their central administration. We also observe that significantly more SOEs in downstream industries are majority privatized than minority privatized. This suggests that the state is likely to hold stakes and remain control in privatized firms in upstream sectors. 
 [Table 3 is here]
Next we take a closer look at the patterns of firm performance and privatization revealed in the data. Figure 2 graphs the number of privatization cases in each of the quantiles of the firm’s previous year performance based on the statistics of the raw data used. Together with the added trendlines, these graphs highlight a quadratic or inverted-U or L shaped relationship between the frequencies of privatization cases and firm performance, for performance measures. There are less cases of privatization among the worst and the best performers compared with the firms in the peak of the performance distribution.  
[Figure 2 is here]
5.	The Selection in Privatization 
5.1.	Model specification and estimation strategy 
We start by considering firm privatization as a one-off event, similar to most studies in the literature (e.g. Liu et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2008; Szentpéteri and Telegdy, 2010). Privatization is identified when a fully state-owned firm starts receiving non-state capital share in equity, irrespective of the magnitude of privatization.​[20]​ Hence, a dichotomous variable is constructed to capture ownership change, with a value equal to one when privatization occurs, and zero if not. A Probit model is used to estimate the probability of a firm being selected into privatization based on the pre-privatization characteristics. The Probit equation takes the following form: 
			
									(1)
where ‘i’ indexes the individual firm, ‘j’ indexes the industrial sector, and ‘t’ indicates time. A fully state-owned firm i is privatized if a latent index variable priv*it takes a value greater than zero at time t. Our main interest is a set of variables that predict the key criteria of the selection. In particular, firm performance indictors (X) and its quadratic term (X2) are included to test the nonlinear relationship between firm performance and the selection in privatization. We follow Gupta et al. (2008) to construct two productivity measures, (Q-W), and (Q/L-W/L). (Q/W) is the difference between the value of total output (Q) and the total wage bill (W), and (Q/L-W/L) is the difference between the value of the average product of labour and the average wage, where L is employment. While these two output measures underestimate the total cost, ignoring other inputs than labour, such as intermediate inputs, the focus is directly on the relationship between revenues and labour costs. It also serves the purpose of providing comparable results to the existing literature.​[21]​ Following our previous discussion, we predict that the marginal effect of the performance measure gives us a positive sign, while the quadratic term gives us a negative sign, which amounts to show an inverted-U shaped relationship between firm performance with the probability of being selected in privatization.
	The variable LAB is labour cost or potential settlement costs, measured by average wage per employee. According to the financial incentives of privatization, governments should prioritize the SOEs that have higher settlement costs in privatization, to relieve the financial burdens. DEBT stands for debt ratio and is measured by total loan over total assets. Financial incentives may drive local governments and banks to sell SOEs with high debt, although from the demand side, high-debt SOEs may not be popular among buyers.
The dummy variable of CENTRAL is coded one when an SOE is affiliated with the central government, and zero otherwise. As previously discussed, the major players behind the privatization policy are local governments, especially those at the municipal and county levels (Liu et al., 2007; Garnaut et al., 2005). Local governments are less likely to be able to influence the divestment of central government affiliated firms, and hardly benefit from selling them. Hence, the prediction is that centrally affiliated SOEs are less likely to be privatized or will be privatized later than others, ceteris paribus.
TURB is a sector variable of industrial turbulence, which is the total rate of industrial entry and exit in each three-digit industrial sector for each region from year t-1 to t as suggested by Beesley and Hamilton (1984).​[22]​ Large-scale simultaneous entry and exit in an industry can be taken as an indication of low sunk costs as in the traditional empirical industrial organization literature. In the Chinese context, we postulate that a high rate of entry and exit may indicate that a sector starts embracing the market by opening to more private entrepreneurs, as lively dynamics may mean plentiful business opportunities. Consequently, we expect to see a positive sign of the privatization selection effect. 
A dummy variable DOWN is specified in the model, following Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) and Gupta et al. (2008), to test if downstream industries are prioritised in privatization. The theory contends that private ownership has the prime advantage of responding to demand shock and input cost volatility over the state sector, while state companies tend to ignore such signals due to political interference, soft budget constraints, weak managerial incentives for gathering information, and an effective market monitoring device. Thus downstream sectors are hypothesized more efficient and beneficial from the increased responsiveness to information about demand conditions after privatization. These sectors are defined to include food, textiles, leather, footwear, paper, publishing, electronic machinery and equipment, and transportation sectors. We summarize the hypotheses and the proxy variables used in the analysis in Table 4.
[Table 4 is here]
Finally, Di is a set of time, industrial sector and regional dummies. The disturbances ωit follow a standard normal distribution. The Probit model is estimated by a maximum likelihood function, with firm being a clustered residual to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
We employ several specification tests to verify the appropriateness of our modelling approach. First of all, aside from the individual statistical significance of the quadratic term of firm performance, we also test joint significance of the linear and quadratic term of performance using the Wald statistics. 
Second, in order to capture firm performance and characteristics prior to the selection, we lag all explanatory variables by one year. This is to deal with some of the unobserved heterogeneity that correlates with firm performance and determines the selection.​[23]​ We further test the potential endogeneity designed for a Probit equation with potential continuous endogenous variables using a simple two-step test due to Rivers and Vuong (1988, henceforth RV). The first-stage equation for each firm performance variable involves its lagged value and all other lagged explanatory variables in the selection equation; and in the second stage, the residual estimated from the first stage is included in the baseline selection model. A joint statistical significance of firm performance variables and the predicted residual indicates the presence of likely endogeneity.​[24]​ 
In nonlinear regression models such as a Probit model, the intuition about the coefficients of the interaction terms differs from linear models. The marginal effects of the changes in the interacted variables, in our case squared terms, are not equal to the magnitudes of changes in the interaction terms. The usual inferences, such as those based on z-statistics and odds-ratio interpretation, cannot be used (Norton et al., 2004). Instead, we calculate the marginal effects based on the predicted probability difference with and without including the interaction terms, and calculate the standard errors by applying the Delta method in a similar approach as that of Ai and Norton (2003).
5.2.	Results
Table 4 reports the results of the selection equation estimates, with columns (1)-(2) reporting the estimates of the baseline model as in Equation (1). Figure 3 illustrates the results. The RV and MLE tests give no evidence of the endogeneity in either models. The marginal effect estimates of the selection criteria show that our productive efficiency measures, together with their quadratic terms, all yield a statistically significant inverted U-shape relationship between the probabilities of privatization and firm productive efficiency. Compared to the firms located in the middle of the productive efficiency distribution, the worst and the best performing firms are less likely to be privatized. Relative to the least performing firms, better performance makes SOEs more likely to be selected in privatization, but only to a certain point. Then, the likelihood of privatization diminishes. Put differently, the worse and the best firms have stronger tendeny to remain state-owned.  It is notable that the evidence for the top end of the distribution is less strong compared to the low end of the invested-U shape. 
We calculate the turning point of the inverted-U shape employing the algorithm due to Thori and Mehlum (2010) designed for nonlinear relationship and 95% of Fieller confidence intervals. Further comparing the sample distribution with the predicted turning points, we find that overall majority of the firms are located on the left-hand side of the turning points, and there are only a small number of firms that are located on the right-hand side of the turning points. However, given that they are at the very top of the scale in performance, their presence is still significant. Our results indicate that Chinese local governments are likely to treat the very best firms differently from the rest, less than 5% on the top, in the process of a decade of privatization.
Our independent variables come up with hypothesized signs and consistent estimates. Labour settlement costs, LAB, yield statistically significant positive signs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that governments minimizing compensation and settlement costs associated with failing SOEs, and hence SOEs with higher labour cost, are more likely to be selected in privatization, all else being equal. 
DOWN all have positive and significant signs, as predicted by theory. Firms located in downstream industries are more likely to first be selected into privatization. It seems that the practice of privatizing sectors in China is common with that in the Czech Republic (Gupta et al., 2008) which allows flexible management and absorbs a more advanced management practice. 
The marginal effects of CENTRAL are consistently negative and statistically significant across all model specifications. Firms affiliated to the central governments are less likely to be involved in privatization, as expected. We did not find any significant estimates of DEBT, debt ratio, across model specifications, which suggests that overall debt ratio is not a good predictor of the privatization selection decision from the point of view of governments over the period examined. 
Industrial turbulence, TURB, has significant positive signs in most specifications, as expected. Firms are more likely to be privatized in an industrial sector and regions where market is not only more lively and open to investors, but also functions more effectively, in terms of its allowing creative destruction. 
[Table 5 here]  [Figure 3 here]
6.	The staging in privatization
Although the above Probit analysis has good properties and is easy to estimate and interpret, a dummy variable of privatization is unable to capture additional information on privatization, such as the staging, or the magnitude, of the privatization. The approach of treating all ownership transfers as equal, as is adopted in a majority of the existing studies, ignores the stage of privatization at which firms may be, and assumes that the selection criteria into privatization for a 10% state transfer into private hands, for example, are the same for a 90% transfer. Hence we construct a measure of the percentage of equity capital transferred from a full SOE to the private sector, and estimate the following Tobit equation: 
        
	  				(2)
where is the latent variable of the percentage of ownership transferred from the state to the non-state sector, and only observable when it is greater than zero. The other notations remain the same with the selection model (1). ωit has a standard normal distribution. The Tobit model is estimated by a maximum likelihood function, with all regressors being lagged one year, and a firm-clustered residual to correct for heteroskedasticity. Similar to the Probit model, the marginal effects are calculated based on the difference in the predicted probability with and without including the interaction term, with the standard errors calculated by applying the Delta method. 
Table 6 Column (1)-(2) reports the estimates of the marginal effects of the determinants of the magnitude of privatization by the Tobit equation (3). The predicted signs of the productive efficiency measures are consistent with our hypotheses and the estimates of the selection model. We find a statistically significant inverted U-shape between the extent of privatizations and firm performance. This means that the worst and the best performing firms tend to convert less capital stake to private hands, conditional on being selected into privatization, compared to the firms in the middle. A higher extent of privatization is associated with better performance, but only to a certain point, and after that the magnitudes of privatization start to decrease. Again, the evidence for the top end of the distribution is less strong compared to the low end of the invested-U shape. This result echoes the finding in the Probit equation, and indicates that not only the worse and the best firms tend to be left behind in privatization; when they are selected, they also tend to be privatized to a less extent.
A potential drawback of the static model of privatization determinants is its inability to account for a firm’s past privatizing experience, as some SOEs do take steps to privatize their ownership. The fact that an SOE already has private shareholders may affect the possibility of further transfer of its state share. It may encourage an SOE to further privatization if it is more open to a competitive market. On the other hand, it may also be that the governments wish to hold on to the existing shares and prefer not to privatize further. In either way, such a static model does not incorporate the dynamic nature of the staging of privatization. We apply the consistent dynamic Tobit estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005) to deal with path dependence, which deals with the initial condition problem.​[25]​ 
Table 6 Column (3)-(4) shows the estimation results. After controlling for the past privatization experience, the results of the performance variables are qualitatively unchanged. The evidence confirms an inverted U-shape between the extent of privatization with firm performance and the worst and the best firms tend to experience less private capital conversion, as compared to the firms in the middle. 
It is worth mentioning that once firm-specific time average covariates are included in the dynamic panel estimation, the lagged firm labour cost stops being a statistically significant explanatory variable, while the average labour cost level is positive and significant. The essence of the interpretation remains the same in that governments prefer shifting the financial burden, due to the SOEs’ higher settlement costs, into private hands, all else being equal. The estimates of other variables are largely consistent with the previous results. 
[Table 6 is here]
7.	The sequencing in privatization – time to event analysis
Some may argue that firm privatization is not a decision made at the time of the privatization; it is a latent accumulated status change. The time that an SOE takes to get “ready” to be privatized reflects the sequencing in privatization. Time elements, more exactly, the unobserved heterogeneity associated with time, not only determine which firms are privatized, but also which firms are privatized earlier.​[26]​ A major advantage of utilizing survival analysis in this context is that time elements, such as economic environment and changing privatization policy, can be taken into account in the modelling of event occurrence. 
We employ a Cox regression with continuous time-varying covariates to model the probability of a firm being privatized using a hazard rate specification. The hazard rate or the probability of privatization for firm i in period t conditional on having remained state-owned up to that point, is denoted as  is given by
		(4)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, and the regressors have the same notation as before. The only difference from the previous specifications is that DOWN and D are time invariant, and D only includes regional and industrial sector dummies; the rest are time-varying covariates and lagged variables are specified in the model. We choose a flexible specification for the baseline hazard and employ the Cox proportional hazard model, which imposes a proportional characteristic-specific shift in the baseline hazard. 
A source of concern in the estimation of hazard models is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.  As shown by Lancaster (1990), unobserved heterogeneity, if neglected, would bias the proportionate response of the hazard to variation in each regressor at any survival time. For this reason, we estimate the hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity that follows a gamma distribution. Once more, for such a nonlinear model, we calculate the marginal effects based on the predicted probability difference with and without including the interaction term, and calculate the standard errors by applying the Delta method.
We find that the coefficients on the control variables of the hazard model are broadly consistent with the expectations and hence, we focus on the performance variables. The results are in line with our previous finding, and offer insights into the sequencing in privatization. We find a statistically significant inverted U-shape between the sequencing in privatization and firm performance. This means that the worst and the best performing firms are less likely to be privatized either in the initial period of reform or much later towards the end, as compared to the firms in the middle of the distribution. After the initial period, better performing SOEs are more likely to privatize earlier, to a certain point, and then they become less likely to be privatized as time goes by. 
[Table 7 here]
Taken together, these results suggest that not only does the firm located at the two ends of the performance distribution tend to be left behind in privatization, and be privatized to a less extent when they are selected; they are also less likely to be privatized in later years when the overall economic conditions grew favourable. Related to the fact that the Chinese privatization was the government’s desperate measure in a desperate situation at an earlier stage, this result demonstrates an undocumented yet clear change in the privatization policy over the last decade. 
We further test the sensitivity of using alternative measures of firm productive efficiency, with one being an internal measure of performance, firm total factor productivity (TFP) and the other an external measure of performance, market share. Our main results are qualitatively the same, both before and after dealing with the endogeneity issue.​[27]​ 
8.	Conclusions
More than a decade has passed since the start of privatization in China. Although the state ownership of the economy has been considerably reduced, the state sector remains large, and the process of privatization is far from completion. Based on the observations of Chinese state-owned enterprises over the last decade (1998-2008), our analysis on the selection, staging and sequencing of privatization shows that the process is complex, and government decisions are not driven by a single motive, but reflect an overall balancing action between economic, financial and political objectives. 
Our results indicate that in the recent Chinese privatization, firm performance in productive efficiency relates to the selection, staging and sequencing in privatization in an inverted-U fashion. The worse and the best performing SOEs tend to remain in the state sector, and maintain a higher state holding when they are selected for privatization. These firms are also less likely to be privatized later in time, given all other conditions being equal. The selection patterns and the changing privatization policy over the last decade identified in this paper describe the slowdown of the privatization reform. This also indicates “the State advances and the Private retreats”, and mirrors the recent prevailing message in the media of revising state-directed capitalism and its rising power in emerging economies. In the on-going debate on the pros and cons of Western liberal capitalism versus a rise of state capitalism, a promising revenue for future research would be to investigate the consequence of such a changing policy in the Chinese economy, not only for the directly affected state sector but, more importantly, for the resource-starved and challenge-surrounded private companies.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1:Loss-making SOEs in China: 1994-1997


	Year	Total loss of loss-making SOEs	Total profit of profitable SOEs	The number of industrial sectors in which SOEs are loss-making on average





Note: The exchange rate between RMB Yuan with USD during this period was around 8:1. 
Source: A Chronicle History of the Chinese State-owned Enterprises Reform, by Dicheng and Zhang (2006), page 403. 


Table 2: Privatization profile of China: 1998-2008
Year	Total number of fully SOEs	Privatization cases
		All	Among all



















Table 3: Summary statistics of the data

	All	I. SOEs	II. Minority privatized SOEs	III. Majority privatized SOEs
 	All firms	Firms remain state-owned	Firms privatized with minority private share (<50%)	Firms privatized with minority private share (≥50%)






















Obs(#)(% in total)	96128 (100%) 	54605 (56.8%)	9378 (9.8%)	32145 (33.4%)
Firm (#)(% in total)	47498 (100%) 	38180 (80.4%)	2148 (4.5%)	7170 (15.1%)
Variable definitions: (Q/W) is the difference between the value of total output (Q) and the total wage bill (W), and (Q/L-W/L) is the difference between the value of the average product of labour and the average wage, where L is employment. TFP is total factor productivity, estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach in each of the NACE two-digit industrial sectors. Market share measures firm’s market share in the three-digit SIC industry in each province as a proxy for realised profitability. LAB is labour cost or potential settlement costs, measured by average wage per employee. DEBT stands for debt ratio and is measured by total loan over total assets. CENTRAL is dummy with value one when an SOE is affiliated with the central government, and zero otherwise. TURB is a sector variable of industrial turbulence, which is the total rate of industrial entry and exit in each three-digit industrial sector for each region from year t-1 to t. Down is a dummy variable capturing the sectors of food, textiles, leather, footwear, paper, publishing, electronic machinery and equipment, and transportation sectors.






Table 4: Theoretical predictions of the privatization models
Theory	Rationale	Proxy/Variable	Selection criteria
Economic factors 
(1) Maximizing economic efficiency (oE)	Governments maximizing economic efficiency should privatize less profitable, loss-making and less efficient SOEs. Efficiency considerations may also dictate the shutting down of unviable firms. 	Firm performance	-
(2) Maximizing efficiency through information gain  (oI)	Privatization should begin where demand or cost volatility is the greatest and where it maximizes the information flow.	Downstream sector	+
(3) Competition effects	Privatization is prioritized in the sectors that are more competitive.	Turbulence	+
Financial factors
(4) Maximizing indirect revenue through tax and other income (oR)	Governments maximizing their revenue should keep the best SOEs (as state-owned) and retain the profit from them. Governments maximizing their revenue should privatize the worst SOEs and hope that they perform better in private hands. The revenue through taxes is the same, irrespective of ownership.	Firm performance	-
(5) Minimizing compensation and settlement costs  (oL)	Governments minimizing revenue should privatize SOEs with higher settlement costs to relieve the financial burden.	Employees' settlement costs; total wage and benefit	+
(6) Maximizing debt relief (oD)	Governments maximizing debt relief should private SOEs that are loss-making and with a higher debt level, which will also help banks relieve non-performing loans to SOEs.	Firm performance	-
		Debt	+
Political factors
(7) Minimizing demonstration effects (oDM)	Governments maximizing the chance to achieve demonstration effects to investors on reform resolution, reform outcome and sound investment environment, to attract FDI and enhance regional competiveness. 	Firm performance	+
(8) Minimizing political risk  (oRK)	Governments minimize political risk of receiving public accusation of selling off public assets and social discontent, which would endanger their chance of career progression. 	Firm performance	-





























MLE test for exogeneity of X through Ho: ρu,v = 0; asymptotic t test for , p-value	0.40	0.370
RV test for exogeneity of X; Wald test , p-value	0.81	0.74
Inverted-U		
Exclusion restriction test on X and X2: Wald test for joint significance; , p-value	0.000	0.000
Sasabuchi-test of inverse U-shape in X (p-value), lower bound/upper bound	0.000/0.000	0.000/0.000
Estimated turning point	2.75	0.49
Bounds of 95% Fieller interval	(2.63  2.90)	(0.47  0.52)
Percentages of firms fall in each side of the turning points [left, right]	[96.7%, 3.3%]	[96%, 4%]
Observations	131,480

Note 1: This table presents the marginal effect estimates of privatization selection models for the Probit model. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable constructed to capture the privatization, with a value equal to one when a fully state-owned enterprise starts receiving a private share in equity, and 0 if not. 
Note 2: All estimations include the full sets of industry, time and regional dummies, all of which are jointly significant in all specifications. 
Note 3: The marginal effects of the interaction terms are calculated based on the predicted probability difference with and without including the interaction term, and the standard errors are calculated by applying the Delta method in a similar approach as in Ai and Norton (2003). 
Note 4: For an explanation of the Sasabuchi-test and the Fieller interval see Section 4.2. The percentages of the firm that fall in each side of the turning points are calculated based on the previous year observations and only restricted to SOEs.
Note 5: Standard errors corrected for clustering by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 


Table 6: Staging in the recent Chinese privatization




































Exclusion restriction test on X and X2: Wald test for joint significance; 	32.08(0.000)	61.43(0.000)		
RV test for exogeneity of X; Wald test 	0.33(0.56)	3.11(0.08)		
MLE test for exogeneity of X through Ho: ρu,v = 0; asymptotic t test for 	0.805(0.28)	-0.157(0.398)		
Observations	124,189	124,189	87,870	87,870
Note 1: The presented estimates in the table Column (1)-(2) are by Tobit estimation as in equation (2) and Column (3)-(4) are for the dynamic panel Tobit model (Wooldridge, 2005) as in equation (3). The dependent variable Δnsoe_sh is the change of the share of non-state equity capital in year t and t-1, Δnsoe_sh  (0,1), which indicates the extent in privatization. 
Note 2: The marginal effects of the interaction terms in these columns are calculated based on the predicted probability difference with and without including the interaction term, and the standard errors are calculated by applying the Delta method in approaches similar to Ai and Norton (2003). 
Note 3: All estimations include the full sets of industry, time and regional dummies, all of which are jointly significant in all specifications. Note 5: Standard errors corrected for clustering by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

























Note 1: This table presents the estimates of the Cox regression as in equation (4) with continuous time-varying covariates to model the probability of a firm being privatized. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable constructed to capture the privatization, with a value equal to one when a fully state-owned enterprise starts receiving private shares in equity, and 0 if not. 
Note 2: All estimations include the full sets of industry, time and regional dummies, all of which are jointly significant in all specifications. 
Note 3: Standard errors corrected for clustering by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Privatization profile in China, 1998-2008














Figure 3: Predicted Inverted-U: probability of privatization and firm performance












^1	  The Djankov and Murrell (2002) survey indicates that 47% of the pre-2003 studies do not control for the selection issue. 
^2	  Such as Poland (De Fraja and Roberts, 2009); Czech Republic (Gupta et al., 2008) and Romania (Szentpéteri and Telegdy, 2010).
^3	  Earlier work includes, for example, Jefferson and Su (2006), Liu et al. (2006), and Huyghebaert and Quan (2009), among others.
^4	  A more detailed account of the history of China’s take-off can be found in a recent symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives such as Huang (2012), while Jefferson and Su (2006) details the stages of China’s early ownership reform in the late 1990s.
^5	  It was designed as a transitional price mechanism from a planned economy to a market economy.
^6	  Also see Naughton (1992) and Jefferson et al. (2000). 
^7	  “gaizhi” means “transforming the system” in Chinese. During this period, the word “privatization” has been largely avoided formally.
^8	  The other side of the enterprise reform was the reforms in labour markets which were parallel (see Meng 2012 for a recent review).
^9	  Gupta et al. (2008) use profitability and disparity between the marginal product of labour and wage in the Czech case, and find support in the prediction. Based on 1995-2001 firm level data, Song and Yao (2004) also find the cherry-picking phenomenon. However, Dinc and Gupta (2011) do not find any correlation between efficiency and selection for privatization in India, nor do the two studies using Chinese data (Guo and Yao, 2005; Liu et al., 2007).
^10	  Fiscal problems may be acute at the time of the institutional reform, which may both affect the capacity of the government to raise tax revenue and result in some temporary increase in spending. This is where privatization revenue can make a difference, such as in Czech Republic and Hungary (Mickiewicz, 2010). 
^11	  Unlike part of the CEE where mass privatization took place, the gradual nature of privatization made local governments feel uncertain about the direction of the reform. The privatization is supervised by the Central government, and the performance of local government officials is evaluated by the system of administrative centralization. Hence, exchanging SOEs for quick cash would be very risky in this context. Moreover, unlike in the CEE countries, local governments rarely had any large shortage of funding, partially due to the significant income from land use.
^12	  Since 1994, most SOEs stopped remitting profits to governments, tax income has been the main source of revenue (Qian and Roland, 1998; Cao et al., 1999; Liu, 2008).
^13	  As a popular saying goes, “it doesn’t matter what it is (the ownership), what matters is where it is (i.e. the location, hence where the tax should be paid)”.
^14	  This relates to the recognized patterns that governments gaining popularity and voter goodwill in many other countries in the wider literature of privatization (Szentpéteri and Telegdy, 2010; Dinc and Gupta, 2011).
^15	  In the last thirty years of economic reform, there has been a dramatic increase in the labour disputes; see more figures and discussions in Gallagher (2005). 
^16	  This may also stir up serious disgruntlement and patriotic movements among people. For example, in 2004, there was an unprecedented nation-wide debate, well known in media as the ‘Lang-Gu Dispute’, on the losses of national assets in the privatization process. 
^17	  Above-scale refers to firms reaching the threshold of sales above 5 million RMB (roughly USD600,000). 
^18	  The observations with negative or zero employment records were dropped, as were those with negative assets and intermediate inputs. The variables of interest have been trimmed by 1% on each side of the distribution.  We excluded firms that amount to 1% of the sample that record flipping capital shares between state and non-state owners, which might be due to miscoding, misreporting or, in the less likely cases, firms where the state released ownership and regained it in a very short period for strange reasons. We only keep those SOEs that were initially fully state-owned, and drop those that started with non-state ownership and became fully state-owned at some point in the period, although these cases are very few. The tobacco sector is excluded from the analysis as privatization rarely occurs in such a highly state-monopolized sector.
^19	  Each case is a fully state-owned enterprise transferring the capital stake to private owners. 
^20	  This would also mean that only the first round of privatization is considered in the case of multiple rounds of privatization of the same firm.
^21	  It is worth mentioning that we do not employ accounting profit for several reasons. In our sample, a considerable amount of SOEs are loss-making, which renders profitability negative. In addition, when the losses of Chinese SOEs were often directly due to the function of maintaining employment and engaging in command production, rather than the productive operation, it would be known to the buyers and hence, be likely to be taken into account when considering the acquisition. Therefore, profitability may not be the primary selection criteria in privatization. Furthermore, it is often subject to reporting errors (Gupta et al., 2008).
^22	  Entry and exit rates are identified with the information on firm establishment dates and their presence in the dataset. For each year t (t=1999,…,2007), an entry (exit) rate can be calculated by the ratio of entry (exit) incidences in year t over total firm numbers in year t-1 of each three-digit industrial sector for each region. TURB is the sum of the entry rate and exit rate. 
^23	  If firms have knowledge of their odds of being selected to privatize, an endogeneity problem would exis, as long as the knowledge of being selected leads to corresponding actions to prepare for the future selection. 
^24	  Given RV test is a limited information procedure, we also tried a Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) test (Wooldridge, 2005), which is a full information and more efficient procedure. It invokes a simultaneous estimation of our baseline selection equation, while firm performance determines the equation with a similar specification to the one used in the VR test. A statistically significant joint distribution of the two residuals would indicate potential endogeneity.
^25	  The interpretation of the coefficients is slightly different and perhaps more desirable: controlling for the past privatization experience, how the extent of privatization is determined. See more details of the application and the model specifications in the supplementary material of the paper, and available under request. 
^26	  Time to event analysis, also known as survival modelling, has also been widely used in the social science research where the interest is in analysing time to events such as job changes or firm exit while in our case, it is appropriate to analyse the time to the event of privatization.
^27	  The analysis adopts Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach and the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin (2009) estimators to estimate TFP in each of the NACE two-digit industrial sectors , and measure firm’s market share in the three-digit SIC industry in each province as a proxy for realised profitability. While these measures deliver qualitatively the same results, there is a difference in resulting different turning points of the inverted-U shape between internal and external performance measures. All additional results and our interpretations are available under request. They are also available in the longer version of this paper.
^28	  See many anecdotal reports on the new reforms directions in China following the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Congress, e.g. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec28674c-13ac-11e4-84b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EVcFZM2F. 
